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Abstract
Data sharing has become of primary importance in many domains such as big-data analytics, economics and medical research,
but remains difficult to achieve when the data are sensitive. In fact, sharing personal information requires individuals’ unconditional
consent or is often simply forbidden for privacy and security reasons. In this paper, we propose Drynx, a decentralized system for
privacy-conscious statistical analysis on distributed datasets. Drynx relies on a set of computing nodes to enable the computation
of statistics such as standard deviation or extrema, and the training and evaluation of machine-learning models on sensitive
and distributed data. To ensure data confidentiality and the privacy of the data providers, Drynx combines interactive protocols,
homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs of correctness, and differential privacy. It enables an efficient and decentralized
verification of the input data and of all the system’s computations thus provides auditability in a strong adversarial model in which
no entity has to be individually trusted. Drynx is highly modular, dynamic and parallelizable. Our evaluation shows that it enables
the training of a logistic regression model on a dataset (12 features and 600,000 records) distributed among 12 data providers
in less than 2 seconds. The computations are distributed among 6 computing nodes, and Drynx enables the verification of the
query execution’s correctness in less than 22 seconds.
Index Terms
decentralized system, distributed datasets, privacy, statistics, machine learning, homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge
proofs, differential privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
To produce meaningful results, statistical and machine-learning analyses often demand large amounts of data. Although data
storage and computation costs have dropped over the years, notably due to low-cost and powerful cloud-computing solutions,
the sharing of these data is still cumbersome. Massive amounts of data are generated daily to track individuals’ actions, health,
shopping habits, interests, political and religious views [1], but privacy concerns and ethical/legal constraints often prohibit or
discourage the sharing of personal and sensitive data. In Europe, the new data-protection regulation, General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [2], effective since May 2018, requires that (a) the collection and use of personal data can only be done with
the consent of the subject and (b) that the data have to be anonymized or encrypted before being shared. This leads to a conundrum,
especially in domains such as demography, finance and health, where data have to be shared, e.g., for enabling research, but they
also need to be protected to ensure individuals’ fundamental right to privacy. Cross-border data sharing is even more challenging,
as the legislations among countries can be heterogeneous, forcing companies to geographically adapt their own privacy measures.
Multiple examples show that even when data can be shared, a centralization of the data can have serious consequences,
affecting hundreds of millions of individuals [3], [4]; this was the case with the Equifax breach [4], in which personal information
(including social-security numbers and credit-card information) of more than 143 million consumers (about 40% of the US
population) was compromised. Centralized solutions are subject to multiple threats as the central database, which stores data
from multiple mutually-untrusted sources, constitutes a high-value target for possible attackers and a single point of failure.
Existing solutions for secure databases [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] usually add a cryptographic layer on top of the query engine
or focus exclusively on the data-release privacy, e.g., by using differential privacy. However, most of these solutions have a
significant performance overhead or are still fully centralized hence either have a single point of failure, or do not protect the
data during the query execution.
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2In this context, decentralized data-sharing systems [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15] have raised considerable interest and are
key enablers for privacy-conscious big-data analysis. By distributing the storage and the computation, thus avoiding single points
of failure, these systems enable data sharing and minimize the risks incurred by centralized solutions. Nevertheless, many of
these systems rely on honest-but-curious or trusted third-party assumptions that might not provide sufficient guarantees when
the data to be shared are highly sensitive, valuable, influential or private. Other solutions with stronger threat models, e.g., UnLynx
[16], are limited in the computations they support, e.g., sum only. Moreover, none of these solutions considers the possibility
that both computing entities and data providers can be malicious.
Improving upon and using some techniques introduced in UnLynx, we propose Drynx, an operational, decentralized and
secure system that enables queriers to compute statistical functions and to train and evaluate machine-learning models on data
hosted at different sources, i.e., on distributed datasets. Drynx ensures data confidentiality, data providers’ (DPs) privacy and
protects individuals’ data from potential inferences stemming from the release of end results, i.e., it ensures differential privacy.
It also provides computation correctness. Finally, it also ensures that strong outliers, either maliciously or erroneously input
byDPs, cannot influence the results beyond a certain limit, and we denote this by results robustness. These guarantees are
ensured in a strong adversarial model where no entity has to be individually trusted and a fraction of the system’s entities can be
malicious. Drynx relies on interactive protocols, homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs of correctness and distributed
differential privacy. It is scalable, dynamic and modular: Any entity can leave or join the system at any time and Drynx offers
security features or properties that can be enforced depending on the application, e.g., differential privacy.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
• We propose Drynx, an efficient, modular and parallel system that enables privacy-preserving statistical queries and the training
and evaluation of machine-learning regression models on distributed datasets.
• We present a system that provides data confidentiality and individuals’ privacy, even in the presence of a strong adversary.
It ensures the correctness of the computations, protects data providers’ privacy and guarantees robustness of query results.
• We propose techniques that enable full and lightweight auditability of query execution. Drynx relies on a new efficient
distributed solution for storing and verifying proofs of query validity, computation correctness, and input data ranges. We
exemplify and evalutate the implementation of this solution by using a blockchain.
• We propose and implement an efficient, modular and multi-functionality query-execution pipeline by
– introducing Collective Tree Obfuscation, a new distributed protocol that enables a collective and verifiable obfuscation
of encrypted data;
– presenting multiple data-encoding techniques that enable distributed computations of advanced statistics on homomorphically
encrypted data. We propose new encodings, and improvements and adaptations of previously introduced private-aggregation
encodings to our framework and security model;
– adapting an existing zero-knowledge scheme for input-range validation to our security model;
– proposing a new construction of the Key Switching protocol introduced in UnLynx [16], improving both its performance
and capabilities.
To the best of our knowledge, Drynx is the only operational system that provides the aforementioned security and privacy
guarantees. Drynx implementation is fully available at www.github.com/ldsec/drynx.
II. RELATED WORK
Centralized systems for privacy-preserving data sharing [8], [17], [18], [19] and trusted-hardware based solutions [20] usually
require one entity, i.e., a central entity or a hardware provider, to be trusted, which constitutes a single point of failure. Even though
these systems can be more efficient than their decentralized counterparts, they often require a centralization or outsourcing of the
data storage, which goes against regulations or is cumbersome to achieve [21] and can be inappropriate for sensitive data. In Drynx,
we avoid these issues by decentralizing data-storage, computation and correctness verification, thus efficiently distributing trust.
In order to execute queries and compute statistics on distributed datasets, multiple decentralized solutions [10], [12], [14], [22],
[23], [24], [25] rely on techniques that have a high expressive power, such as secret sharing and garbled circuits. These solutions
are often flexible in the computations they offer but usually assume (a) honest-but-curious computing parties and (b) no collusion or
a 2-party model. Furthermore, they do not provide a way to check the computations undertaken in the system. Although they might
efficiently distribute trust, their strong honesty assumptions are risky when the data or the computed statistics are highly sensitive.
Bater et al. [10] enable the evaluation of various SQL queries on datasets hosted by a set of distrustful data providers, but both the
data providers and the computing entity are trusted to follow the protocol. Corrigan-Gibbs and Boneh [26] propose Prio, a system
that ensures privacy as long as one computing entity out of n is honest, but it only guarantees end results robustness in the case
where the involved parties are all honest-but-curious. Moreover, Prio does not protect against DPs colluding among themselves
or with the computing nodes. In Drynx, no entity has to be individually trusted in order to provide both privacy and robustness.
3Systems relying on homomorphic encryption [11], [13], [16], [27], [28], [29] are often limited in the functionalities they
offer (e.g., sum only). They present high-performance overhead in comparison with their less secure counterparts or still
rely on honest-but-curious parties. In our previous work, we presented UnLynx [16], a decentralized system that enables the
computation of (only) sums on distributed datasets and ensuresDPs’ privacy and data confidentiality. UnLynx assumesDPs
to be honest-but-curious and, unlike Drynx, it does not ensure end results robustness. Moreover, UnLynx does not provide a
practical solution for auditability. In this work, we show how to overcome these limitations and provide a system that enables
secure computations of multiple operations in a stronger threat model.
There are multiple solutions proposed for the problem of training machine-learning models on distributed data in a privacy-
preserving way [13], [27], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36]. Mohassel and Zhang [30] propose a two-party solution,
SecureML; it enables the training of specific models, e.g., linear regression. Boura et al. [31] present a solution that relies on
a novel and more flexible approximation of the logistic regression function but assumes honest-but-curious parties. Nikolaenko
et al. [27] and Juvekar et al. [32] combine homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits to perform private ridge-regression
and neural-network inference, respectively. Aono et al. [33] and Kim et al. [13] rely on homomorphic encryption to train an
approximated logistic regression function. Zheng et al. [36] combine homomorphic encryption and distributed convex optimization,
in their system called Helen, in order to collaboratively train linear models. Recently, multiple solutions based on federated learning
(relying on differential privacy and edge computing) have been proposed [24], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42]. These solutions
aim at protecting the resulting model from inference attacks [43], [44]. Some of these works [37], [39] assume a trusted party that
holds the data, trains the machine-learning model, and performs the noise addition to achieve differential privacy guarantees. Other
works [24], [29], [38], [45], [46] propose solutions for distributed settings in which the parties exchange differentially private model
parameters with the help of an untrusted server that trains a collective global model. These approaches are computationally efficient
but usually require very high privacy budgets to obtain a useful collective model (due to the noise addition); hence it is unclear what
privacy protection they achieve in practice [47]. To this end, some works attempt to obtain more useful models in the distributed
setting by combining differential privacy with homomorphic encryption [40], [41] or multi-party computation techniques [42].
However, most of these solutions are specifically tailored, parameterized and optimized for a given operation, e.g. gradient descent,
and would require a redesign if used for different operations. Finally, they assume a weaker threat model with honest-but-curious
computing parties and, unlike Drynx, they do not enable verification of computation correctness and results robustness.
III. BACKGROUND
We introduce Drynx’s main components and two exemplifying use cases. We describe the cryptographic tools that we use
to distribute trust and workload. We present the blockchains that we use to implement our solution to ensure Drynx’s correctness
and auditability. Finally, we introduce the notion of differential privacy and verifiable shuffle, which are at the core of our solution
to ensure individuals’ privacy.
A. Use Cases
We illustrate Drynx’s utility in the medical sector, as it is a paradigmatic example where privacy is paramount and data
sharing is needed. Recently, multiple initiatives have emerged to realize the promise of personalized medicine and to address
the challenges posed by the increasing digitalization of medical data [48], [49], [50]. In this context, the ability to share highly
sensitive medical data while protecting patients’ privacy is becoming of primary importance. We illustrate the possible use of
Drynx in two specific settings that cover most medical data sharing scenarios: (1) Hospital Data Sharing (HDS), where multiple
hospitals enable statistical computations and the training of machine-learning models across their datasets of patients (e.g., [50],
[51]), and (2) Personal Data Sharing (PDS), where a medical institute runs studies, e.g., on heart issues, by directly computing
on data collected from people’s wearables (e.g., [52], [53]).
B. ElGamal Homomorphic Encryption
Drynx requires an additively homomorphic cryptosystem; we choose to rely on the Elliptic Curve ElGamal (ECEG) [54], which
enables an efficient use of zero-knowledge proofs for correctness [55]. However, Drynx’s functionality is not bound to this choice
and can be achieved with other cryptosystems. ECEG relies on the difficulty of computing a discrete logarithm in a finite field; in
this case, an Elliptic Curve subgroup ofZp, with p a big prime. The encryption of a messagem∈Zp is EΩ(m) = (rB, mB+rΩ),
where r is a uniformly-random nonce in Zp,B is a base point on an elliptic curve G and Ω a public key. The table of symbols
is presented in Appendix A. The additive homomorphic property states that EΩ(αm1+βm2) = αEΩ(m1) + βEΩ(m2) for any
messagesm1 andm2 and for any scalarsα and β. In order to decrypt a ciphertext (rB,mB+rΩ), the holder of the corresponding
private key ω (Ω=ωB) multiplies rB and ω yielding ω(rB)=rΩ and subtracts this point frommB+rΩ. The resultmB
is then mapped back tom, e.g., by using a hashtable. Drynx relies on fixed-point representation to encrypt floating values.
4C. Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Universally-verifiable zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) can be used to ensure computation integrity and to prove that encrypted
data are within given ranges. In Drynx, we choose to verify computation integrity by using the proofs for general statements
about discrete logarithms, introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [55]. These proofs enable a verifier to check that the prover
knows the discrete logarithms y1 and y2 of the public values Y1 =y1B and Y2 =y2B and that they satisfy a linear equation
A1y1+A2y2 =A, (1)
whereA,A1,A2 are public points on G. This is done without revealing any information about y1 or y2.
The input-range validation is done by relying on the proofs proposed by Camenisch and Chaabouni [56], with which we can
prove that a secret messagem lies in a given range [0,ul) with u and l integers, without disclosingm. The prover writes the
base-u decomposition of its secret valuem and commits to the u-ary digits by using the verifier signatures on these digits. The
l created commitments prove to the verifier thatm∈ [0,ul). We present this proof, adapted to our framework, in Algorithm 1.
Finally, both proofs can be made non-interactive through the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [57].
D. Interactive Protocols
Interactive protocols can be used to distribute the computations and the trust among multiple computing nodes CNs. In Drynx,
each CNi possesses a private-public key pair (ki,Ki) where ki is a uniformly-random scalar in Zp andKi=kiB is a point
on G. The CNs’ collective public key isK=∑#CNi=1 Ki. The corresponding secret key k=∑#CNi=1 ki is never reconstructed
such that a message encrypted by usingK can be decrypted only with the participation of all CNs. An attacker would have
to compromise all CNs in order to decrypt a message. As shown in Section V, to produce the intended results, Drynx protocols
require the participation of all the CNs.
E. Blockchains
A blockchain is usually a public, append-only ledger that is distributively maintained by a set of nodes and serves as an
immutable ledger [58], [59]. Its main applications are in cryptocurrencies [59], [60] but is also used in other domains, e.g., health
care [61]. Data are bundled into blocks that are validated through the consensus [62], [63] of the maintaining nodes. Each block
contains a pointer (i.e., a cryptographic hash) to the previous valid block, a timestamp, a nonce, and application-specific data.
The chain of these blocks forms the blockchain.
F. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is an approach for privacy-preserving reporting results on statistical datasets, introduced by Dwork [64].
This approach guarantees that a given randomized statistic,M(DS)=R, computed on a datasetDS, behaves similarly when
computed on a neighbor datasetDS′ that differs fromDS in exactly one element. More formally, (, δ)-differential privacy [65]
is defined by Pr[M(DS)=R]≤exp()·Pr[M(DS′)=R]+δ, where  and δ are privacy parameters: the closer to 0 they are,
the higher the privacy level is. (, δ)-differential privacy is often achieved by adding noise to the output of a function f(D). This
noise can be drawn from the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale ∆f , where ∆f , the sensitivity of the original real valued
function f , is defined by ∆f=maxD,D′||f(DS)−f(DS′)||1. Other mechanisms, e.g., relying on a Gaussian distribution, have
also been proposed [66], [67].
G. Verifiable Shuffles
To randomly select a value from a public list of noise values and to ensure differential privacy, we rely on a verifiable shuffle
[68], [69], [70], [71]. We implemented and use the verifiable shuffle of ElGamal pairs, described by Neff [69]. This protocol takes
as input a list of χ ElGamal pairs (C1,i, C2,i) and outputs (C¯1,i, C¯2,i) pairs such that for all 1≤i≤χ, (C¯1,i,C¯2,i)=(C1,υ(i)+
r′′υ(i)B,C2,υ(i)+r
′′
υ(i)Ω), where r
′′
υ(i) is a re-randomization factor, υ is a permutation and Ω is a public key. The permutation υ is
used to change the order of the ElGamal pairs and r′′υ(i) is used to modify the value of the ciphertext encrypting a messagem such
that its decryption still outputsm. As a result, an adversary not knowing the decryption key, υ and the r′′υ(i) is unable to link back
any ciphertext (C¯1,i,C¯2,i) with a ciphertext (C1,i, C2,i). Neff provides a method for proving that such a shuffle is done correctly,
i.e., that there exists a permutation υ and re-randomization factors r′′i,j such that output = SHUFFLEυ,r′′i,j(input), without revealing
anything about υ or r′′i,j. This is achieved by using honest-verifier zero-knowledge proofs, introduced by Neff [68], [69].
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this section, we describe the system and threat models, before presenting Drynx’s functionality and security requirements.
5Fig. 1: A querierQ, Data ProvidersDPi, Computing Nodes CNi and Verifying Nodes VNi.
A. System Model
The system model is represented in Figure 1. For simplicity, we describe here the logical roles in Drynx, and in Section VIII
we discuss the fact that a physical node can simultaneously play multiple roles. A querierQ can execute a statistical query and the
training and evaluation of a machine-learning model on distributed datasets held byDPs. The CNs collectively handle the com-
putations in the system; i.e., fromQ’s perspective, they emulate a central server and provide answers to her queries. The verifying
nodes’ (VNs) role is to provide auditability; they collectively verify the query execution and immutably store the corresponding
proofs. They enable an auditor, e.g.,Q or an external entity, to easily verify (audit) the correctness of the query execution.
In Drynx’s typical workflow, the query is defined by the querierQ and is then broadcast to the CNs andDPs. TheDPs
answer with their encrypted responses that are then collectively aggregated and processed by the CNs, before the result is sent
to Q. We assume that the used data formats are sufficiently homogeneous among differentDPs and that theDPs are able
to interpret the queries, e.g., there is a common ontology of attributes and the query-language is agreed-on during system setup.
An exemplifying instantiation of this systemmodel in theHDS scenario (Section III-A) would feature theCNs as universities
that want to enable researchers (Q) to compute on data held by multiple hospitals (DPs). VNs can be independent or
governmental institutions ensuring that data protection regulations are respected.
We assume that the system’s topology and public information, e.g., public keys, are known by all entities. Authentication
and authorization are out of scope of this paper and we briefly discuss them in Section VIII.
B. Threat Model
We assume a strong threat model:
• Queriers. They are considered malicious as they can try to infer information about theDPs from the queries end results or
by colluding with other entities in the system.
• Computing Nodes. We consider an Anytrust model [72], which means that all Drynx’s security and privacy guarantees (Section
IV-D) are ensured, as long as at least one of the CNs is honest-but-curious (or plain honest).
• Data Providers. TheDPs are considered malicious as they can try to produce an incorrect answer to a query in order to bias
the final results. They can also collude with other nodes to infer information about otherDPs or about a query end-results.
• Verifying Nodes.We assume that a threshold number of the VNs is honest. This threshold, e.g., fh=2f+1 out of ft=3f+1,
where ft is the number of VNs, is defined depending on the consensus algorithm [62], [63] that is used to ensure a correct
and immutable storage of the proofs’ verification results.
C. Functional Requirements
Drynx enables the computation on distributed datasets of any operation in the family of encodable operations. An encodable
operation can be separated in two parts: theDPs’ local computations and the collective aggregation. In the collective part, the
computations are executed on encrypted data and are thus limited by the homomorphism in the used cryptographic scheme,
e.g., additions and/or multiplications.DPs’ computations are executed locally and are therefore not limited.
Definition 1. An encodable operation f computed amongN DPs is defined by:
f(r¯)≡pi({ρ(r¯i)}Ni=1),
in which the encoding ρ is defined by
ρ(r¯i)≡(Vi,ci),
where Vi =[vi,1,...,vi,d] is a vector of d values computed on a set of ci= |r¯i| records, where |.| stands for cardinality. r¯ is the
set of all distributed datasets’ records, r¯i is the set of records that belong toDPi, and pi is a polynomial combination of the
6outputs of the encodings ρ. The encodings are defined as locally computed functions on the subsets (r¯i) of eachDPi. It is also
possible to express an encodable operation as a recursive function:
fk(r¯)≡pi({ρ(r¯i,fk−1(r¯))}Ni=1).
In Drynx, for any specific operation f , eachDPi creates an encoding ρ computed on its set of records r¯i. Then, pi is executed in
two parts: theCNs first aggregate allDPs’ encodings outputs (
∑N
i=1{ρ(r¯i)}) and, if needed, the querier post-processes pi on the
aggregated result (e.g, if pi involves information-preserving operations not executable by the CNs under homomorphic encryption).
We give here an instantiation of Definition 1 that enables the computation of the average, and in Section VII we show how an
encoding can be instantiated to enable the computation of: sum, count, frequency count, average, variance,
standard deviation, cosine similarity, min/max, AND/OR and set intersection/union, and
the training and evaluation of linear and logistic regression models.
For example, if Q wants to compute the average (f) heart rate over multiple patients across hospitals (HDS (Sec-
tion III-A)), each hospital (DPi) answers with the encoding of its (encrypted) local sum of each patient’s heart rate (h):
ρ(r¯i)≡ ([
∑ci
j=1hi,j],ci). These encodings are then (homomorphically) added across all hospitals, and Q can (decrypt and)
compute the global average by using pi=
∑N
i=1vi,1/
∑N
i=1ci. We remark here that whereas ρ and pi are application dependent,
the workflow is common to all the possible operations.
Finally, in Drynx, an auditor can efficiently audit a query execution. Moreover, the proofs required for auditability are produced
such that their creation does not affect the query runtime.
D. Security Requirements
Drynx must ensure:
• Data confidentiality. The data input by theDPs have to remain confidential at any time. OnlyQ is able to see the query answer.
• DPs’ privacy. No entity is able to infer information about one singleDP or about any individual storing his data in aDP ’s
database.
• Query Execution Correctness.We consider the query execution to be correct when both results robustness and computation
correctness requirements are met:
– Results robustness. The query results are protected against strong outliers, either maliciously or erroneously input by theDPs.
– Computation correctness. Any computation undertaken by the CNs is correctly executed.
V. DRYNX DESIGN
To overcome the limitations in existing works and meet the requirements presented in the previous section, we propose a novel
system model in which we enable query auditability by introducing VNs. Additionally, Drynx provides multiple functionalities
in a stronger threat model by relying onDPs that encode locally computed results proven to be within a certain range. It limits
the trust inDPs by controlling that their results are in these pre-defined ranges. We propose a system that remains generic and
practical while operating in a threat model stronger than existing works. We discuss now the design of this system.
In Drynx’s Security Design (Section V-A), we show how we build Drynx to meet all its security requirements:
• In Section V-A1, we introduce a simple query-execution pipeline enabling Drynx’s functionalities and protecting data
confidentiality.
• In Section V-A2, we build upon the previously introduced query-execution pipeline and explain how to ensureDPs’ privacy
by introducing the new concept of a neutral encoding. This enables aDP to privately choose whether to answer a query. We
also explain how Drynx handles bit-wise operations and maintainsDPs’ privacy. Finally, we introduce distributed differential
privacy that is used to ensure that no entity infers information about a singleDP or individual from the query end results.
• In Section V-A3, we show how we provide auditability in an efficient way by relying on a set of VNs. We describe how
Drynx ensures results robustness by leveraging on range proofs and how all Drynx’s computations can be verified by relying
on proofs of correctness.
In Drynx’s Optimized Design (Section V-B), we discuss how to optimize Drynx’s performance:
• In Section V-B1, we present Drynx’s full query-execution pipeline. We show how multiple parts of the query execution and
verification can be run concurrently thus optimize Drynx’s runtime.
• In Section V-B2, we introduce a tradeoff between security and performance by enabling a probabilistic verification of the
query execution.
7A. Drynx Security Design
We present Drynx core security architecture.
1) Data Confidentiality: First, we introduce a confidential distributed data-sharing system (Figure 2) that can run the same
operations as Drynx, but only meets one of the security requirements: data confidentiality.
We describe the query execution protocol, and sketch the proof of confidentiality for this system. Afterwards, we describe
how to enhance this construction to meet Drynx’s other security requirements without breaking data confidentiality.
Fig. 2: Confidential System Query Execution.
1) Initialization. Each CNi,DPi and Qi generates its own private-public key-pair (ki,Ki). The CNs’ public keys are then
summed up in order to createK, the CNs’ public collective key that is used to encrypt all the processed data.
2) Query.Q formulates the query that is broadcast in clear through the CNs to theDPs. Although the querier could directly
communicate with theDPs, our choice simplifies the communication scheme and the synchronisation inside the system,
as the CNs have to know the query and receive theDPs inputs to perform the computations in the remaining steps. The
query defines the operation, the attributes on which the operation is computed, the participatingDPs and (optionally) the
filtering conditions. Drynx works independently of the query language. We illustrate its use with a SQL-like query to compute
the average heart rate among patients for which data are held by n DPs:
SELECT average heart_rate ON DP1, ..., DPn
WHERE patient_state = ′hypertensive′
3) Retrieval & Encoding. TheDPs compute their local answer by following ρ which is defined in the operation encoding
(Definition 1). For this purpose, they first locally retrieve the corresponding data.
4) Encryption. TheDPs encrypt their encoded answer underK and send the corresponding ciphertexts back to the CNs.
5) Collective Tree Aggregation (CTA). The CNs collectively aggregate allDPs’ responses by executing a CTA protocol rely-
ing on the Collective Aggregation protocol defined in UnLynx [16]. TheCNs are organized into a tree structure such that each
CN waits to receive the aggregation results from its children and sums them up before passing the result on to its own parent.
6) Collective Tree Key Switching (CTKS). The CNs collectively convert the aggregated result, encrypted underK, to the
same result encrypted underQ’s public keyK′, without ever decrypting. This protocol (Protocol 1) is a new construction
of the Key Switching proposed in UnLynx [16]. Conceptually, each CN partially decryptsm (i.e., the term−(C1)ki in the
computation in step 2) and re-encrypts it withQ’s public keyK′ (i.e., the term +αiK′ in step 2).
Protocol 1 Collective Tree Key Switching (CTKS)
Input. EK(m) =(C1, C2)=(rB,mB+rK), K′
Output. EK′(m) =(C′1,C′2)=(r′B,mB+r′K′)
Protocol.
1. The root CN1 sends C1 down the tree to all CNs.
2. Each CNi generates a secret uniformly-random nonce αi and computes wi,1 =αiB and wi,2 =−(C1)ki+αiK′
3. The CNs collectively aggregate (i.e., using CTA) all the wi,1 and wi,2.
4. CN1 finally computes (C′1,C′2)=(
∑
wi,1,C2+
∑
wi,2)=(r
′B,mB+r′K′) where r′=
∑
αi.
We improve the efficiency of CTKS by changing the way the ciphertexts are transformed and by organizing the CNs in
a tree structure, thus reducing its execution time. In this structure, multiple CNs can perform their local operations (3 scalar
8multiplications and 1 addition) in parallel, and the CTA requires #CN−1 aggregations and communications between the
nodes. We show the computational complexity of all Drynx protocols in Table II.
7) Decryption.Q decrypts and decodes the query results.
Security Arguments.We show that, as long as one CN is honest, an adversary who controls the remaining CNs,DPs and
Q cannot break data confidentiality. Without loss of generality, we assume that at least oneDP is honest, as only in this case
there is data to protect from the adversary. We sketch the proof by relying on the real/ideal simulation paradigm [73] and show
that an adversary cannot distinguish a “real" world experiment, in which the adversary is given “real" data (sent by honestDPs),
and an “ideal" world experiment, in which the adversary is given data (e.g., random) generated by a simulator. It can be shown
that theDPs send encrypted data that are never decrypted before being aggregated and re-encrypted (CTKS) underQ’s public
key. Therefore, due to the cryptosystem’s semantic security, the adversary cannot distinguish between a simulation and a real
experiment. It can be seen that data confidentiality is thus ensured during end-to-end query execution:
In Retrieval & Encoding, theDPs operate only on their local data and no external data is seen by any malicious party. In
Encryption, theDPs encrypt their responses withK and these responses are aggregated, still under encryption, in CTA. The
(summed) ciphertexts cannot be decrypted unless all CNs collude, which is not possible as they follow an Anytrust model.
Finally, in CTKS (Protocol 1), a ciphertext is switched fromK toQ’s public key such thatQ can decrypt:
• in CTKS Steps: 1-3. The ciphertext is encrypted underK and thus cannot be decrypted without the collusion of all CNs.
• in CTKS Step: 4. The ciphertext is always (C˜1,C˜2)=(r˜B,mB+r˜K′) where r˜=
∑t
i=0αi and 0≤t≤#CN and can only
be decrypted if the t CNs collude withQ, who is the intended recipient of the message.
2) DPs’ Privacy: Drynx protectsDP s’ and individuals’ privacy by ensuring that (a) eachDP can privately decide whether
to answer a query, (b) only the result of the operation, as defined by the operation encoding, is disclosed toQ, and (c) no entity
can infer information about a singleDP or individual.
a) Neutral Response: If aDP determines that a query can jeopardize its privacy, it can choose to not respond, or answer
with a neutral response, thus hiding its refusal to participate in the query without distorting the query results. For this purpose
we define neutral response:
Definition 2. ADPi sends a neutral response by defining its response encoding (Definition 1) by ρ(r¯i)≡(O,0), where O is
the neutral vector such that W+O=W with W being any encoding vector; ci=0 asDPi computes on 0 records.
In Section VII, we describe how a neutral response can be generated for each listed encoding.
Security Arguments. ADP not answering a query would suggest (leak) to other entities that this query is too sensitive for
it.DPs’ responses are always encrypted and, due to the indistinguishability property of the underlying cryptosystem, a neutral
response is indistinguishable from a non-neutral one, thus effectively hiding theDP ’s refusal.
b) Privacy-Preserving Bit-wise Operations: In Drynx, DPs’ responses are summed through the available additive
homomorphism; if these responses are binary, the result of the sum can leak toQmore than the operation result. For example, when
an OR operation is executed over a set ofDPs,Q should only know if the answer is true (1) or false (0). Nevertheless, if the
DPs’ responses are naively summed,Q gets the number ofDPs that answered ‘1’ and ‘0’. To overcome this issue, we propose
the Collective Tree Obfuscation (CTO)protocol, detailed in Protocol 2. For bit-wise operations,CTO is run between stepsCTA
and CTKS of the query execution. In CTO, the CNs collectively obfuscate a ciphertext by multiplying it with a random secret.
CTO enables privacy-preserving bit-wise operations in Drynx as a ‘1’ is obfuscated to a random value whereas ‘0’ is preserved.
To know the result of the operation,Q only checks if the final value is ‘0’ or not.
Protocol 2 Collective Tree Obfuscation (CTO)
Input. EK(m) =(C1, C2)=(rB,mB+rK)
Output. EK(sm) = (srB,smB+srK)
Protocol.
1. Root CN1 sends (C1, C2) down the tree to all CNs.
2. Each CNi generates a secret uniformly random nonce si and computes (Cˆi,1,Cˆi,2)=si·(C1, C2)
3. The CNs collectively aggregate (i.e., using CTA) all the (Cˆi,1,Cˆi,2).
4. CN1 obtains EK(sm) = s·(C1, C2) where s=
∑
si.
Security Arguments. Protocol 2 does not hinder the confidentiality ofm and indeed obliviously and statistically obfuscatesm.
The confidentiality relies on the cryptosystem’s semantic security, asm remains encrypted during the whole protocol execution.
A multiplicative blinding ofm in Zp is defined by s·m, where s is a secret scalar value in Zp. The output of the CTO protocol
is the encryption of (
∑
si)·m. We can rewrite (
∑
si)·m by separating the contributions of the honest CNs h (at least one
9CN due to our Anytrust model assumption) and malicious CNs e: (
∑
i∈hsi+
∑
i∈esi)·m=(
∑
i∈hsi)·m+(
∑
i∈esi)·m.
Even if an adversary knows (
∑
i∈esi)·m, the other term (
∑
i∈hsi)·m ensures a multiplicative blinding ofm in Zp.
c) Distributed Differential Privacy: Drynx relies on the Collective Differential Privacy (CDP ) protocol, introduced in
Unlynx [16], to ensure differential privacy, and prevent information inference about someDPs and/or individuals from the query
results. For completeness, we briefly present the CDP (Protocol 3) and refer to [16] for more details. The choice of parameters
depends on the application’s privacy policy and is out of the scope of this paper.
Protocol 3 Collective Differential Privacy (CDP)
Input.  (defined in Section III-F), ∆f: query sensitivity, and θ: quanta
Output. EK(nˆ1,...,nˆ˜l)
Initialization
1. The distribution LD=Laplace(0,∆f/) is publicly agreed on.
2. LD is publicly sampled, using the quanta θ, to a list of l˜ noise values n˜1,...,n˜˜l.
Protocol.
1. Each CN privately and sequentially shuffles n˜1,...,n˜˜l, producing EK(nˆ1,...,nˆ˜l).
2. First elements of EK(nˆ1,...,nˆ˜l) are used as oblivious noise values and added to the query result.
Security Arguments.We observe that the list of noise values is verifiably generated from the differential privacy parameters
and that all the CNs privately shuffle the values. This protocol’s security is analyzed in details in UnLynx [16].
3) Query Execution Correctness: We first describe how Drynx provides auditability by enabling an efficient verification
of the query execution correctness. The latter is achieved by guaranteeing results robustness and computation correctness. The
first is ensured by limiting theDPs’ values to be in a specific range (by means of range proofs) and the second by using ZKPs
for all the CNs computations.
a) Auditability: To provide an efficient solution for the query verification, Drynx relies on a set of VNs that verify the
query correctness in parallel to its execution and without affecting its runtime. After each operation, Q, the CNs andDPs
create proofs of correct computations or value range that they sign with their private key (to provide authentication). Their signed
proofs are sent to all the VNs. This enables an efficient query execution as the proof creation and verification are executed
independently from it.
In order to implement this solution, we can rely on the distributed architecture of the VNs and can provide integrity and
immutability by using a blockchain, i.e., the proof blockchain. This enables the public and immutable storage of both the query
and its verification results. Moreover, it enables an efficient and lightweight verification of the query correctness. An auditor,
e.g.,Q, has only to request the block corresponding to the query, to verify the VNs signatures and to check the query verification
results. We detail this in Protocol 4 and show an example of the proof blockchain in Figure 3.
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Protocol 4 Query Verification
Query
Q:
1. Q signs and broadcasts the query to the VNs.
VNs:
1. Each VN verifiesQ’s signature.
2. Each VN deterministically derives the list of expected proofs for the query. It initializes a query-proofs map that stores the result
of the verification for each proof: true, false, not received (before a predefined timeout).
Query Execution.
DP or CN:
1. ADP or CN executes an operation, then creates, signs and sends the corresponding proof to the VNs.
VNs:
1. Each VN verifies the prover’s signature.
2. Each VN verifies the proof and stores the result in its query-proofs map.
3. Each VN stores the proof in its local (key, value)-database. The key is uniquely and deterministically derived from the query, the
prover’s ID and the proof type.
End of Query Execution (or timeout).
VNs:
1. One of the VNs (e.g., chosen in a round-robin fashion) gathers all VNs’ query-proofs maps.
2. The same VN creates a block containing the Query Unique ID, the Query and all the query-proofs maps.
3. The block is sent around such that each VN checks that its query-proofs map and the query are correctly saved. If this is the case,
the VN signs the block.
4. The VNs run a consensus algorithm such that a block signed by a threshold fh of VNs is consistently added to the blockchain.
Each VN keeps a local copy of the blockchain.
Fig. 3: Proof blockchain. Each block contains Query ID and content, and each VN’s query-proofs map. RP is range proof.
Security Arguments. If an entity trusts a threshold fh of the VNs, it can verify the query correct execution by checking the
corresponding block in the proof blockchain. The verifier can check that fh nodes agree on the correctness of the proofs. A
block is created for every query, even if the proofs are wrong, thus enabling any entity to determine which parties were involved
in incorrectly computed queries. Otherwise, as all the proofs are universally verifiable and stored by all VNs, an auditor, not
trusting fh of the VNs, can request the proofs from a subset of them and check the proofs by itself.
b) Results Robustness: If the querier defines a query with range boundaries on theDPs’ values, theDPs are requested to
create proofs of range by following the algorithm detailed in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is built by adapting the [0,ul)-range proof
scheme proposed by Camenisch et al. [56] to the Anytrust model. In this algorithm, the prover, i.e.,DP , writes its secret valuem
in base-u and commits to the u-ary digits by using the CNis’ signatures on these digits (Ai,b in Algorithm 1). The l created com-
mitments complete the proof. To adapt this algorithm to the Anytrust model, theDP must compute multiple proof elements, i.e., c,
Vi,j, ai,j, by combining allCNs’ signatures, i.e.,Zi,Ai,b. This ensures that theDP uses at least oneCN’s signature for which it
does not know the underlying secret. The same transformation in [56] can be applied to generalize the proof to any range [bl,bu).
Security Arguments. Both the correctness and the zero-knowledge property of the range proof are proven by Camenisch et
al. [56].
These proofs are universally verifiable and sound in the Anytrust model. The latter comes from the fact that the elements depending
on the CNs’ secrets xi are computed as a combination of all their public signatures. As at least one CNi is honest-but-curious,
one of the xi is unknown (not revealed) to theDP (prover).
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Algorithm 1 Input Range Validation in Anytrust Model
ADP proves that its secretm∈ [0,ul), where u and l are two integers. C2 =mB+rΩ corresponds to the right part of EΩ(m)=(C1,C2).
e() is a pairing function (bilinear map [56]) on an Elliptic Curve andH is a hash function.
Initialization:
1: Each CNi picks a random xi∈Zp and computes Zi←Bxi,Ai,b←B(xi+b)−1 ∀b∈Zu.
2: All Zi andAi,b are made public.
Proof Creation:
1: DP computes value c=H(B,C2,
∑
iZi) and
2: for each j∈Zl such thatm=
∑
jmju
j do
3: Pick three uniformly-random values sj,tj,vj∈Zp
4: for each computing node CNi do
5: Vi,j=Ai,mjvj
6: ai,j←−sj ·e(Vi,j,B)+tj ·e(B,B)
7: end for
8: zvj←tj−vjc (mod p) and zmj←sj−mjc (mod p)
9: end for
10: DP picks n∈Zp and computes zr=n−rc (mod p) andD←
∑
jBu
jsj+Ωn
11: DP publishes proof={C2,c,zr,zvj ,zmj ,D,ai,j,Vi,j} ∀j∈Zl and ∀i∈{1,...,#CN}.
Proof Verification:
1: Any entity can check that:
D=C2c+Ωzr+
∑
jBu
jzmj and ai,j=e(Vi,j,Zi)c−zmj ·e(Vi,j,B)+zvj ·e(B,B), ∀j∈Zl and ∀i∈{1,...,#CN}.
c) Computation Correctness: In order to ensure the correctness of the query execution, each computation executed by
a CN has to be proven correct.
• Collective Tree Aggregation. The CNs provide to-be-aggregated input ciphertexts and the resulting ciphertexts that constitute
the ZKP.
• Collective Tree Obfuscation. The CNs produce an obfuscation proof by relying on Expression (1) in Section III-C. Each CNi
multiplies C by si to obtain the obfuscated ciphertext (C′1,C′2) with (a) C′1 =siC1 and (b) C′2 =siC2. For both equations,
y1 =si is the discrete logarithm; we have the public values A=C′1, A1 =C1 for (a) and A=C′2, A1 =C2 for (b), which
constitute the proof.
• Collective Differential Privacy. In this protocol, each CN sequentially executes a Neff shuffle and produces the corresponding
ZKP of correctness described in Section III-G. This proof basically contains the input and output lists, the public key encrypting
the ciphertexts, and commitment values.
• Collective Tree Key Switching. The CNs create the ZKP by applying Equation (1) in Section III-C, in which we have y1 =ki,
y2 =αi, the discrete logarithms of kiB=Ki and αiB, respectively. All pointsKi, αiB,A=wi,2,A1 =−rB andA2 =K′
are made public and do not leak any information about the underlying secrets.
Security Arguments.We rely on proofs that are universally verifiable and zero-knowledge. They do not affect data confidentiality
beyond what can be inferred from the proven facts themselves.
B. Drynx Optimized Design
Wepresent Drynx’s final query execution pipeline, before describing how the query verification’s performance can be optimized.
1) Full Query Execution Pipeline: We showDrynx’s full pipeline in Figure 4. Query execution and verification are executed
concurrently and multiple steps of the query execution can be executed in parallel. The CNs aggregate eachDP ’s response
in CTA, as soon as they receive it. The noise generated from the CDP has to be added after all the results have been aggregated.
However, if the differential privacy parameters are predefined, this protocol can be executed independently from the other steps
or even pre-computed.
2) Probabilistic Query Verification: To improve the performance of the query verification, we enable a probabilistic
verification of the proofs by the VNs. We show that this strategy still enables a verifier to detect a misbehaving entity with a high
probability, yet considerably improves performance (see Section IX). A proof for a specific operation (e.g., CTKS for a set of
ciphertexts S) can have multiple sub-proofs (e.g., CTKS for one ciphertext C∈S). One proof is considered incorrect if one or
more of the sub-proofs is incorrect.We introduce the two thresholdsT andTsub that define the probability of verifying a single proof
and a sub-proof, respectively. We modify the VNs’ operations in step 2 of theQuery Execution described in Protocol 4, by adding
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Fig. 4: Drynx’s complete optimized query-execution. Arrows represent causal links. Steps without direct links can be executed
independently and dashed steps are optional.
this probabilistic verification based on T and Tsub. Each VN stores all the proof it receives. It then generates a random value r∈
[0,1]; if r<T , it starts the probabilistic verification of the sub-proofs. For each sub-proof, the same method is applied, using Tsub.
Security Arguments. The probabilistic verification does not necessarily compromise the security level of the system, given
that the verification of each proof is redundantly done by each VN . A proof is verified with a probability pver=1−(1−T)NVN ,
whereNVN is the number of VNs, and a sub-proof with a probability pversub =1−((1−T)+T(1−Tsub))NVN . The probability
that a proof or a sub-proof is verified by at least fh nodes is
Pfh =
NVN∑
i=fh
(
NVN
i
)
pi(1−p)NVN−i,
where p is either pver (for a proof ) or pversub (for a sub-proof ). For example, ifNVN =7, T=1 and Tsub=0.3, all the proofs are
at least partially verified and each sub-proof is verified by fh=5 VNs with Pfh =98.48%. Each sub-proof is thus verified by
at least fh of the VNs with a high probability. Due to the honesty assumption, a sub-proof is at least verified by one honest VN
with a high probability. Moreover, the thresholds T and Tsub can be set to arbitrarily reduce the probability that one sub-proof
is not verified by at least one honest node. Therefore, if all the VNs that participated in the verification agree on the result, the
auditor knows the proof is correct, otherwise it can either choose to only trust some of the VNs or fetch all proofs and verify
them itself, as all the proofs are universally verifiable. For example, an auditor can choose to verify only the proofs that were
not checked by any of the VNs she trusts.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We employed only existing, peer-reviewed cryptographic schemes and discussed the composability of the security of the
different blocks in previous sections. We corroborate these arguments with a brief summary of the security analysis.
• Data confidentiality. In Section V-A1, we sketched the proof for confidentiality in our simplified system and discussed in
Section V-A how further design choices do not hinder confidentiality. In summary, data confidentiality is ensured as the data
are always encrypted and no operation, e.g., ZKP creation, affects it.
• DPs’ privacy.DPs can privately decide whether to answer a query, and differential privacy is ensured for theDPs and
individuals, which protects them from potential inferences stemming from the release of end results. The latter is ensured
in Drynx by blindly adding noise, sampled from a specific distribution, to the query end-results. As described in Section V-A2,
this noise can be verified to be from a specific distribution (e.g., Laplacian) and no entity knows which noise value is added.
• Results robustness. This is ensured as allDPs’ values can be verified to be within a certain range and all CNs’ computations
must be proven correct, as depicted in Section V-A3. By enforcing the generation of range proofs byDPs, we protect against
strong outliers, maliciously or erroneously input, which can significantly distort the query results.DPs can still input incorrect
values, but their influence on the final result is limited. We give an intuition on how robust a computation is against such
behavior in Section IX-B.
• Computation correctness. The proofs of correct computations (Section V-A3) ensure that theDPs’ answers are correctly
aggregated (CTA) and that the remaining steps (CTO, CTKS, CDP ) are correctly executed.
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VII. ENCODINGS
We present a set of statistical computations that can be executed in Drynx. We then explain how to instantiate encodings
(Definition 1) for the training of both linear and logistic regression machine-learning models. We adapt the logistic regression
solution, proposed by Aono et al. [33], to our framework, thus enablingQ to train this model in a verifiable and privacy-preserving
way, even in the presence of a strong adversary. Some of the encodings are adapted from the Corrigan-Gibbs and Boneh [26]
system and improved upon.
Numerical Statistics.Table I lists a set of simple statistics that can be performedwith Drynx. The sum, mean, variance,
std. deviation, cosine similarity (cosim) and R2 operations are executed by requiring theDPs to send
the result of their local and partial statistic computation. As an example, for variance, each DPi locally computes the
sum of the values (records) hj that match the query, (
∑ci
j=1hj) where ci isDPi’s dataset cardinality, the square of those same
values (∑cij=1h2j) and generates ρ(r¯i)=([∑cij=1hj,∑cij=1h2j ],ci). These values are independently aggregated among allDPs and the
overall variance is computed by Q, after decryption, using the corresponding pi (defined in Table I). For the frequency
count,DPs are expected to send the vector Vi filled with the number of occurrences (fc) for specific values. The cosine
similarity is computed between two vectors φ and φ¯, where eachDPi holds a subset of the coefficients of each vector.
Operat. (f) pi (onN DPs) ρ
(Vi=[vi,1,...,vi,d],ci)
sum ∑Ni=1vi,1 ([∑cij=1hj], ci)
mean
∑N
i=1vi,1∑N
i=1ci
([∑cij=1hj], ci)
variance σ2 =
∑N
i=1vi,2∑N
i=1ci
−(
∑N
i=1vi,1∑N
i=1ci
)2 ([∑cij=1hj,∑cij=1h2j],
std. dev. σ=
√
σ2 ci)
AND/OR
∑N
i=1vi,1
?
=0 ([Rj],ci) or ([bj], ci)
min/max l/rm6=0(
∑N
i=1vi,1,..., ([Rj,1, ..., Rj,d], ci)∑N
i=1vi,d) or ([bj,1, ..., bj,d], ci)
frequ. count ∑Ni=1vi,1,...,∑Ni=1vi,d ([fcj,1, ..., fcj,d], ci)
set int/un ∑Ni=1vi,1,...,∑Ni=1vi,d ([Rj,1, ..., Rj,d], ci)
or ([bj,1, ..., bj,d], ci)
cosim s(φ,φ)=
∑N
i=1vi,1√∑N
i=1vi,2
√∑N
i=1vi,3
([∑cij=1φjφj,∑cij=1φ2j ,∑ci
j=1φ
2
j], ci)
R2 1−
∑N
i=1vi,3
σ2 ([
∑ci
j=1yj,
∑ci
j=1y
2
j∑ci
j=1(yj−yˆj)2], ci)
TABLE I: Example set of encoding instantiations. AllDPs encodings (ρ) are then aggregated such thatQ computes pi at the end.
Bit-Wise Statistics. As depicted in Table I, bit-wise operations can be executed in two ways: EachDPi either (1) sends a
random encrypted integerR or (2) sends an encrypted bit b. For (1), in the OR (resp. AND) case, eachDPi is requested to
send an encrypted integerEK(Ri), whereRi=0 if the input is 0 (resp. 1), and a random positive integer otherwise. The OR
(resp. AND) expression is true (resp. false) if the sum
∑
Ri>0.Q obtains the final result by testing if the output is 0 or not.
The result of this operation can be erroneous if
∑
Ri≡0mod(#G), or in other words, if the order #G of the Elliptic Curve
subgroup divides the sum of allDPs’ random values. This happens only with a probability smaller than 1/(#G−1) (proof
in Appendix B). This probability is close to 0 as #G is much bigger than the decryptable plaintext values, and can be further
reduced by repeating the query. Alternatively, in (2) eachDPi has to send bi,j=0 or bi,j=1 encrypted value. This eliminates
the error probability but requires more computations and proofs of correctness, as theDPs have to prove that their values are
in {0,1}, and a CTO protocol (Section V-A2b) has to be executed to preserve privacy. The min (resp. max) is computed by
applying the or operation element-wise among vectors Vi. EachDPi computes its local min (res. max)mDPi in a specified
range, e.g., [0:100], which is represented by Vi =[bi,0,...,bi,100]. Each bi,j>mDPi (resp. bi,j<mDPi) is encoded with a ‘1’ (or
random) and a ‘0’ otherwise. The min (resp. max) across allDPs corresponds to the leftmost (resp. rightmost) position with
a ‘1’ in the vector resulting from the OR operation. Similarly, the set intersection (resp. union) is computed
by using the AND (resp. OR) operation element-wise on the vectors Vi.
Regression Models.
Linear Regressions. We assume a dataset distributed over the DPs with D features x1,...,xD and a label value y such that
y≈c0+c1×x1+c2×x2+...+cD×xD. Drynx computes the least-squares linear fit over all theDPs by building a system
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ofD+1 equations thatQ can use in order to compute the linear regression coefficients c0,c1,c2,...,cD: n
∑
xµ,1 ...
∑
xµ,D∑
xµ,1
∑
x2µ,1 ...
∑
xµ,1xµ,D
... ... ... ...∑
xµ,D
∑
xµ,1xµ,D ...
∑
x2µ,D

c0c1...
cD
≈

∑
yµ∑
yµxµ,1
...∑
yµxµ,D
 (2)
where all the sums are between µ= 1 and µ=
∑N
i=1ci. Each DPi sends
∑ci
j=1xj,η,
∑ci
j=1xj,ηxj,ζ,
∑ci
j=1yj,
∑ci
j=1yjxj,η,
∀η,ζ∈{1,2,...,D}, η 6=ζ.
Logistic Regressions. We consider again a dataset ofNda records (distributed among theDPs) with a dimensionD where each
record x(µ) =(1,x(µ)1 ,···,x(µ)D )∈RD consists ofD features and an offset term of 1, and is associated with a label y(µ)∈{0,1}.
The original logistic regression cost function is
J(θ)= 1
Nda
∑Nda
µ=1
[
−y(µ)log(hθ(x(µ)))−(1−y(µ))log(1−hθ(x(µ)))
]
+lrθ,
where hθ(x)=1/(1+exp(
∑D
η=0θηxη)) and lrθ=
λ
2Nda
∑D
η=1θ
2
η, λ is the L2-regularization parameter. J(θ) can be approximated
by a linear function
Ja(θ)=
[
1
Nda
∑k
τ=1
∑D
r1,...,rτ=0
aτ(θrτ ···θrτ )Aτ,r1,...,rτ−a0
]
+LRθ,
by using the fact that log( 1
1+exp(x)
)≈∑kτ=0aτxτ , where a0,a1,..., ak can be chosen as the k+1 first coefficients of the Taylor
expansion of log( 1
1+exp(x)
), or as the coefficients of the quadratic approximation that minimizes the area between the original
function and its approximation. TheAτ,r1,···,rτ coefficients are defined by
Aτ,r1,···,rτ=
∑Nda
µ=1a
(µ)
τ,r1,···,rτ=
∑Nda
µ=1(y
(µ)−y(µ)(−1)τ−1)(x(µ)r1 ···x(µ)rτ ),
where the a(µ)τ,r1,···,rτ are computed and encrypted by theDPs before being collectively aggregated by the CNs.
Neutral Response. A neutral response for and and set intersection isO=[1,...,1], andO=[0,...,0] for other
operations.
Optimized and Iterative Encoding Drynx can also be used in order to execute iterative processes, e.g., a k-means algorithm.
In this case, each iteration can simply be mapped to a query sent to the system. An iterative process can also be used in order
to optimize existing encodings, such as the min and max. In their basic versions, these encodings rely on a d-bit vector in
which each bit represents a value in a predefined range of size d= |bu−bl|. This means that eachDP sends d ciphertexts. This
process can be optimized by using a binary-search iterative process as depicted in Protocol 5. In the Range Reduction step, each
query only requires one ciphertext perDP and reduces by half the range of possible answers. This step is repeated until this
range is reduced to a predefined size EL. It must be noted that the execution of other iterative processes would work in a similar
way: For example, for a k-means algorithm [74],Q performs one iteration by executing one query that includes the centroids in
clear; theDPs then assign their points to the closest centroid before aggregating their points by cluster; then, the same operation
is repeated among allDPs by using Drynx typical query workflow andQ computes the new centroids. As in Protocol 5 and
as described below, this algorithm leaks the intermediate results. We do not address the problem of hiding the intermediate results,
e.g, by using differential privacy, in this work.
Protocol 5 Iterative Process (max example)
Input. Query = max in ra=[bl,bu] andEL
Output.Max value
Range Reduction:
1: while #ra>EL do
2: Q sends SELECT OR (∃v∈ [b (bl+bu)2 c,bu]) ON DP1,..,DPn
3: if query returns true then
4: ra=[b (bl+bu)2 c,bu]
5: else
6: ra=[bl,d (bl+bu)2 e]
7: end if
8: end while
Final Step:
1: Q sends SELECT MAX [bl,bu] ON DP1,...,DPn
Security Arguments. For all encoding and in each query, Q learns the elements of V (aggregated over all DPs) and the
(approximate) number of samples considered c, as defined by encoding.
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For the iterative process, in the Range Reduction, theDPs’ answers remain confidential, but the range is sent in clear in each
query thus revealed to other entities.Q controls the size of the range of possible values that is leaked by defining an entropy limit
EL. In the final step, the max query is privately executed on the remaining range. This provides a tradeoff between performance
and privacy (that we analyze in Section IX). The number of ciphertexts is lowered to n=g+d d2g e, g= blog2( dEL)c, which
reduces the amount of computations and proofs by a factor dn . For example, ifQ wants to know theDPs’ minimum value in
[0,1000) withEL=100, the workload is reduced by a factor of 7.8 and the query leaks a range of 100 possible minimum values.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
We illustrate multiple extensions for Drynx by relying on our use cases,HDS and PDS (Section III-A).
Modularity.Drynx is highly modular and some of its security features can be enabled or disabled, depending on the application.
For example, if results robustness is not required, input-range validation can be omitted without hindering Drynx’s execution
and the remaining security guarantees are preserved. The same applies forDPs’ privacy features, e.g., differential privacy.
For example, inHDS, each hospital (orDP ) locally executes the query on multiple patient records and the range proofs
can be omitted if the range of possible values is too broad or if the hospital is trusted to input correct values. Otherwise, the
range boundaries have to be set accordingly. In this case, the querier has to use her knowledge on the attributes involved (e.g.,
age is between 0 and 150) and the information she has on theDPs’ data (e.g.,DPs have a maximum ofX data samples) to
define the ranges. In PDS, the ranges for the input values can be used to enforce tighter bounds (e.g., heart rate can only take
values in [40,100] beats-per-minute) as eachDP has one data record.
Drynx also enables the collective protection of data at rest by havingDPs locally encrypt their data with the CNs’ collective
keyK. This limits the flexibility of the system asDPs are then required to pre-compute all necessary inputs (e.g., the square
root of the values to enable the computation of the variance) and the range proofs before entering the encrypted data in
their databases. It also requires a fixed set of CNs, as only they can operate with that pre-encrypted data.
As mentioned before, Drynx’s primary goal is to guaranteeDPs’ privacy and still enable the queriers to obtain the results
of computations performed over multiple databases. For this, Drynx enables optional security and privacy features, such as
differential privacy. These features can be enabled or disabled depending on the application requirements, hence enabling multiple
trade-offs between security and privacy, performance and accuracy (see below).
Collusion Resistance. Each participant can play multiple roles without hindering Drynx’s security. For example, inHDS,
a hospital can be aDP and also play the role of aCN , to ensure its data confidentiality without having to trust any other hospital.
It can also be a VN thus take part in the verification process.
Availability. Drynx’s privacy and security guarantees hold even in the case where multiple CNs orDPs become unavailable.
Any entity can leave or join the system without hindering Drynx’s operation, as long as they are not involved in a query under
execution. In the event of a CN becoming unresponsive during the query execution, the CTA and CTKS steps cannot be
finalized, as they both require the participation of all CNs. Therefore, in this case, the process is stopped andQ can request
the same query by choosing another set of CNs, e.g., by excluding the faulty CN(s). An unresponsiveDP only reduces the
number of responses included in the statistic being computed and does not disrupt Drynx’s process. Standard mechanisms, e.g.,
limiting the rate at which queries are accepted, can be implemented in Drynx to avoid DDoS attacks.
Accuracy. There are several aspects that can influence output precision in Drynx. (a) We first remark that theDPs’ inputs
to the system have to be approximated by fixed-point representation if they are floating values, as explained in Section III-B.
(b) Drynx’s encodings and query executions do not intrinsically hinder the accuracy of the computed results, as all operations
are exact, as long as the target function is exactly encodable. In fact, it is worth noting that the encoding for the logistic regression
training is built from an approximation of the original cost function.
Additionally, (c) theDPs can privately decide whether to answer a query; this choice can influence the final result. However,
the number of samples considered in the computation, i.e., ci in Definition 1, is always sent toQ, who can then observe if this
number changed since her last query. It also enables her to take an informed decision on the statistical significance of the results,
to accept them or not.
(d) Drynx can guarantee differential privacy by adding noise to the final result. In this case, Drynx returns approximate results,
and the accuracy loss depends on the chosen privacy parameters and the executed operation. The choice of these parameters
and the perturbation introduced in the results is thus orthogonal to this work.
Finally, (e) malicious DPs can try to distort the query result by inputting erroneous values. Drynx limits malicious DPs’
influence on the final result by enabling the querier to restrict the range of possible inputs. This bounds the perturbation that
someDPs can generate on the results. If the inputs were not bounded, one maliciousDP could completely distort the final
result by inputting extreme values. It is difficult to provide hard numbers for the accuracy of Drynx in the presence of malicious
DPs, as it depends on many parameters such as the executed operation, the chosen input ranges, the number ofDPs and data
records. Nonetheless, in Section IX we show how the use of ranges limits the influence of maliciousDPs in two examples.
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Authentication/Authorization. Authentication and authorization fall out of the scope of this paper, but for the sake of
completeness we briefly mention here that Drynx can integrate off-the-shelf solutions based on federated or distributed architectures
[75], [76], [77].
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We discuss our experimental setup and evaluate Drynx’s performance. We show that it scales almost (in some cases better
than) linearly with the number of CNs, VNs andDPs, and we compare Drynx against existing solutions. We also discuss
multiple security, privacy and performance tradeoffs.
A. System Implementation
We implemented Drynx in Go [78], and our full code is publicly available [79]. We relied on Go’s native crypto-library and
on public advanced crypto-libraries [80]. For the implementation of the proofs’ storage and verification, we use a skipchain
[81], which is made of blockchain-like blocks that, to enable clients to efficiently navigate arbitrarily on the chain, also contain
back-and-forward pointers to older and future blocks. We rely on a (private) permissioned blockchain [82], as in our examples
HDS and PDS (Section III-A), the participants, i.e., researchers, patients or hospitals, have to be known and authorized.
However, Drynx works independently of the blockchain type, and a permission-less blockchain can also be used in a less
restrictive scenario. Drynx works independently of the used elliptic curve; we tested it on the Ed25519 [83] and bn256 elliptic
curves [84]. Both curves provide 128-bit security, and we used bn256 by default as it enables pairing operations (required for
range proofs). Our prototype is built as a modular library of protocols that can be combined in multiple ways. The communication
between different participants relies on TCP with authenticated channels (through TLS).
B. System Evaluation
We used Mininet [85] to simulate a realistic virtual network between the nodes; we restricted the bandwidth of all connections
between nodes to 100Mbps and imposed a latency of 20ms on all communication links. We evenly distributed the CNs,DPs,
VNs andQ on a set of 13 machines that have two Intel Xeon E5-2680 v3 CPUs with a 2.5GHz frequency that supports 24
threads on 12 cores and 256GB RAM.
We begin our evaluation by studying how the different steps in Drynx’s pipeline can be executed in parallel. We then show that
Drynx’s runtime only slightly increases when the number of records perDP grows (and the number ofDPs remains constant).
In our default setup, we consider 6 CNs and 7 VNs.We set the proof verification thresholds T =1.0 and Tsub=0.3 and
show, in Section IX-B1, the effect of these thresholds on Drynx’s execution time. The joint use of these thresholds ensures that
all the proofs are at least partially verified and that each sub-proof is verified by fh VNs with a probability of 98.5%. We show
Drynx’runtime without the CDP protocol as CDP can be pre-computed or run in parallel with other steps. We notice that
the CDP ’s runtime depends on the number of CNs and on the size l˜ of the list of noise values. This creates a tradeoff between
privacy and performance as a greater l˜ provides a higher privacy level, as it reduces δ=1/˜l but also increases the time to generate
and shuffle the list of noise values. With a Laplacian distribution and l˜=100, CDP ’s runtime is 2.9 seconds with an overhead
of 8.1 seconds for the proof verification.
1) Drynx Evaluation: Parallel Execution. Figure 5 shows the runtime for training a logistic regressionmodel. We use a
randomly-generated dataset of 12 floating-point features and 600,000 records split among 12DPs. We remark that the operations
are verified in parallel to the query execution; this parallelization enablesQ to obtain the query results as soon as it is computed
(denoted by query execution dashed line). At the end of the verification process, an auditor can check the query by verifying the
signature and the query-proofs map of the corresponding block in the proofs blockchain, which in this case takes 0.4 seconds. The
blocks’ sizes are small as they only contain the query and the corresponding query-proofs map; in this example one block is 56kB.
Scaling.We show how Drynx’s execution time evolves with an increasing number of data records (Figure 6a), CNs and
DPs (Figure 6b) and VNs (Figure 6c). Inspired byHDS and PDS, we simulate the computation of the heart-rate variance
(values between [0,256)) over a set of distributed patients. In Figure 6a, we observe that Drynx scales better with (a) the number
of records per DP (and fixed number of DPs) than (b) with the number of DPs; case (a) represents HDS, where a DP
is an hospital with a database of multiple patients, whereas case (b) represents PDS, where each patient is aDP (#DPs=
#records). This is because (a) enables theDPs to locally pre-aggregate their data, thus reducing the amount of proofs and
computations. For Figures 6b and 6c and for the remaining part of the evaluation, we set the number ofDPs to 10 per CN . In
HDS, this could correspond to a use case in which someDPs are hospitals and the others are independent doctors sharing their
data. We observe that Drynx’s runtime increases with the number ofDPs, CNs, and VNs. However, an increasing number
of CNs and VNs also means a higher security level, as the trust is distributed among more entities.
Operations. Figure 7 shows Drynx’s runtime for all the operations with a large integer range of [0,220] for each of theDPs’
inputs (the size of theDPs’ inputs is shown below each operation). We observe that for all operations, the query execution
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Fig. 5: Log. reg. training: 8 features, 6000 records, max. iter.: 25.
(a) Variance: increasing nbr. of records.
(b) Variance: increasing nbr. of CNs and
DPs with 10DPs per CN .
(c) Variance: increasing nbr. of VNs.
Fig. 6: Drynx’s scaling.
time is always below 1.5 seconds; and the overhead incurred by the proofs verification increases with the size of theDPs’ inputs.
This is expected, as the larger the DPs’ inputs become, the more ciphertexts there are for the system to process, and more proofs
there are to verify. We also observe that bit-wise operations take more time when theDPs opt to send a bit value that is then
obfuscated (using the CTO protocol).
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Fig. 7: Runtime for different operations with
DPs’ inputs sizes. Range [0,220].
Verification Thresholds. In Figure 8, we show how the different thresholds on the proofs verification affect Drynx’s
performance with a variance query. It can be seen that sending the proofs (communication time is denoted by a dashed line)
is the most time consuming part, and that reducing the thresholds reduces the verification time. For example, by having T=1
and Tsub=0.2, we effectively reduce the verification workload by a factor close to 0.8, and a sub-proof is still verified by fh=5
of the VNs with a high probability (83.48%).
Fig. 8: Variance: proofs verif. thresholds.
Malicious DPs. By enforcingDPs’ values to be within a specific range, Drynx limits the influence of maliciousDPs on
the computed statistic. We illustrate this in a simple and realistic example (using PDH from Section III-A) by computing the
average heart rate over a dataset of 8922 hypertensive patients [86]. The real heart-rate values are limited to be between
40 bpm (beats per minute) and 100 bpm and, as presented by Lorgis et al. [86], the average value obtained among honestDPs
is ah =70 bpm with a 95% confidence interval of ±6 bpm. Each patient (DPi) must send (Vi,ci) = ([heart_rate],count)
(Definition 1), in which heart_rate has to be in [40,100] and count in [0,1]. In order to maximize the result’s distortion, a
maliciousDP can send an extreme value, which is within the range bounds. We assume that all maliciousDPs collude and
send the same value heart_rate=e, and that the computed average is given by am=(h·ah+e·d)/(h+c), where h and d
are the numbers of honest and dishonestDPs, and c is the sum of ci sent by maliciousDPs. The relative error is |1−(am/ah)|.
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We remark that a maliciousDP can maximize this error with a valid input by sending ([100],0). In Figure 9, we observe that
with 1% of maliciousDPs for the range [40,100], the highest relative error is 1.44%. This error corresponds to 1 bpm, still
in the 95% confidence interval. We observe similar results when the cosine similarity is computed in the same settings. For
this example, we also present the worst-case scenario in which the cosine similarity computed on the honestDPs is 1 and the
maliciousDPs input extreme values from the range of accepted values to reduce the similarity. As shown in Figure 9, these
numbers highly depend on the chosen bounds. Even if many other factors influence this error (e.g., the computed operation
and the distribution of the values), it shows that Drynx can limit the power of maliciousDPs.
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Fig. 9: Average and cosim: influence of malicious DPs.
Iterative Queries. Figure 10 depicts how Drynx’s runtime can be reduced by using multiple queries to execute a min/max
operation in a binary-search style. This represents a tradeoff between privacy and performance, as each iterative query is sent in
clear, leaking the interval where the min/max value is. We assume thatQ sets the entropy limitEL=100, in other words, another
entity in the system can learn that the min/max is in an interval of at least 100 values. The precise value is kept private. We
observe that the execution time is not improved when the range is small, but is greatly reduced when the range grows, reaching
an execution time reduction of almost 96% at a range size of 100,000.
Fig. 10: max (iterative): increasing range size.
Communication. Figure 11 depicts Drynx’s runtime evolution with respect to both the communication delay and bandwidth
capacity with a heart rate variance query. We remark that when the latter is reduced by a factor 100, the runtime increases by
a factor 2 or 3. This shows that our system is more sensitive to communication delay than bandwidth capacity.
20
Fig. 11: Variance: runtime w.r.t. network bandwidth and delay.
Bandwidth. In Table II, we present the computation and bandwidth complexities for 1 ciphertext (i.e., 2 points (2p) on the
elliptic curve, 2p = 64 bytes) perDP . We useDP , VN , and CN as the numbers of corresponding entities in the system. s is
the size of the Schnorr signature [57] (s=96 bytes), h is the hash size (h=32 bytes), l comes from the range [0,ul) for the range
proofs (ul=162,l=2), pap is a pairing point’s size (pap=384 bytes) and n is the number of values that are used in the CDP
(n=100). We do not include the computational complexity for the local computations executed by theDPs and CNs. We
refer to Neff’s work [69] for the complexity of the verifiable shuffle (V S). We observe that when the number of CNs and VNs
increases, the computational, bandwidth and storage costs increase for all the steps. As having more CNs or VNs improves
the security and the distribution of the workload in the system, it creates a tradeoff between security, efficiency, and scalability.
DPs answer DPs answer with RV CTA CTO CTKS CDP
QE C.C. - - (CN-1) · A (CN-1)·A + 
(2·CN)·SM 
(CN-1)·A 
(3·CN)·SM 
CN · VS
QE band. DP · 4p 
(1.28kB) 
DP · 4p 
(1.28kB) 
CN · 4p 
(0.768kB) 
2 · CN · 4p 
(1.536kB) 
CN · 6p 
(1.344kB) 
CN · 4p · n 
(76kB)
QV band. 
and 
storage 
DP ·VN 
·(s+4p) 
(15.68kB)
DP · VN · (s + (7 + 2l 
+ 2l · CN)p + l · CN · 
pap + h)    (2.43MB)
CN · V N · 
(s + 4p) 
(9.048kB)
CN ·VN 
·(s+8p+h) 
(16.128kB)
CN ·VN 
·(s+10p+h) 
(18.816kB)
(CN +1)·VN 
·(s+ 13np + h) 
(2.04MB) 
TABLE II: Bandwidth and Storage costs. DP, VN, CN = nbr. of entities; RV = Range Valid.; QE=query exec.; C.C.=comput. complexity;
QV=query verif.; A=ciphertext addition; SM= scalar multi.; VS= verif. shuffle
2) Comparison with ExistingWorks: We supplement the related work’s overview, described in Section II, by presenting
here a qualitative and quantitative comparison with multiple systems that are Drynx’s closest related works. We compare Drynx
against SMCQL [10], UnLynx [16], Prio [26], Boura et al. [31], Aono et al. [33], Kim et al. [13] and Gazelle [32]. In Table
12a, we show that Drynx provides several functionalities in a strong threat model and achieves results that can rival with other
secure and dedicated approaches, notably in the training of logistic regression models as depicted in Figure 12a. Drynx performs
as well or better than its two closest related works, UnLynx and Prio, and provides better security guarantees.
We observe that solutions based exclusively on secret sharing and garbled circuits, namely SMCQL [10], Prio [26] and Boura
et al. [31], offer multiple or advanced functionalities but fail to provide proofs of correct executions. Systems solely based
on homomorphic encryption (HE), namely UnLynx [16], Aono et al. [33], Helen [36] and Kim et al. [13], are limited in the
functionalities they offer. Furthermore, Aono et al. [33] and Kim et al. [13] rely on data centralization. Gazelle [32] combines
HE and garbled circuits and enables complex evaluations of neural networks, but does not protectDPs’ privacy or provide
computation correctness. Contrarily, Drynx enables multiple operations while distributing trust, computations, and data storage,
and it provides strict security guarantees in a stronger adversarial model.
We quantitatively compare Drynx to Unlynx [16] and Prio [26], which are, to the best of our knowledge, the closest prior
works. Drynx’s query execution time for the sum is faster than UnLynx, as we improved the CTKS protocol by enabling
its execution in a tree fashion, thus reducing its execution complexity fromO(#CN) toO(log(#CN)). Unlike UnLynx, Drynx
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enables the verification ofDPs’ value ranges, which, for the computation of a sum, adds an overhead of only 0.6 seconds
(out of a total time of 2 seconds, as depicted in Figure 7). However, Drynx enables a faster scalable verification of proofs by
an auditor. After the proofs are verified and the results stored in the proof blockchain, an auditor can simply request and verify
the corresponding block, which in this case takes approximately 0.4s. In Unlynx, an auditor has to request the proofs from each
entity and verify them by itself, which takes 1.4s.
SMCQL UnLynx Boura et al. Prio Aono et al. Kim et al. Gazelle Helen Drynx
System 
Properties
Distribution of Trust X ✔ ✔ ✔ X X 2-party ✔ ✔
Distrib. Comput. / Stor. ✔ ✔ ‍ ✔ ‍ ✔ ‍ X X 2-party ✔ ✔
Modular architecture X X ✔ ✔ X X X X ✔
Security 
Guarantees
(assuming 
Drynx’s threat 
model)
Data Confidentiality X ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
DPs’ Privacy X ✔ X X X X X ∼ ✔
Comput. Correctness X ✔ X X X X X ✔ ✔
Results’ Robustness X X X X X X X ✔ ✔
Functionalities
Accuracy|AUC
Statistics ✔ X X ✔ X X X X ✔
Lin. Reg. Training X X ✔ ✔ ∼ ∼ X ✔ ✔
Log. Reg. Training
SPECTF [55]
Pima [48]
LBW [38]
PCS [51]
- X ✔ ∼ ✔
75.4|0.76
75.4|0.87
-
-
✔
-
-
69.3|0.66
69.1|0.75
X X ✔
74.8|0.73
77.5|0.83
70.2|0.73
75.1|0.81
Neural Networks X X X X X X ✔ X X
(a) Solutions Comparison. For log. reg., we split the datasets [87], [88], [89], [90] among 10 DPs before
standardization, scale factor =102 for fixed-point represent., learning rate 0.1; 80% train., 20% test.
(b) Comparison with Prio for a min query.
Fig. 12: Drynx’s comparisons.
Prio [26] relies on secret-shared non-interactive proofs that are created by theDPs to prove the correctness of their inputs
to the system and that are collectively verified by the CNs. Even though both systems have similar functionalities, Prio
provides input-range verification and computation correctness only when all the CNs are honest-but-curious. We adapted the
Gorrigan-Gibbs prototype implementation [91] of Prio to a similar deployment environment as Drynx so that both use the same
communication settings, thus enabling a fair comparison. In Figure 12b, we compare Prio’s runtime in an illustrative example
by using the min operation on the range [0,1000) with increasing number of CNs andDPs, against multiple settings of
Drynx. This figure shows that Drynx significantly outperforms Prio when computing min without using obfuscation (CTO)
hence accepts a small probability of error (1/(#G)) and avoids the need for range proofs. If we use obfuscation, Drynx scales
similarly as Prio, but it must be noted that Drynx performs its operations in a stronger threat model. When used in Prio’s threat
model (delimited by a black line), Drynx is about two times faster. This is because each range proof can be sent and verified
by a single VN as all VNs are considered honest-but-curious under Prio’s threat model.
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X. CONCLUSION
We have proposed Drynx, a novel system that enables a querier to compute statistics and train machine-learning models
on distributed datasets in a strong adversary model where no entity is individually trusted. Drynx provides query-execution
auditability and ensures the end-to-end confidentiality of the data. It protects the privacy of the data providers and relies on
an immutable and distributed ledger to provide efficient correctness verification and proofs storage. Drynx is highly modular,
offering configurable tradeoffs between security, privacy, and efficiency. Finally, Drynx enables privacy-preserving computations
of widely-used statistics on sensitive and distributed data, thus offering features that are absolutely needed in crucial areas such
as user-behavior analysis or research for personalized medicine.
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APPENDIX A
TABLE OF SYMBOLS
Symbol Description
HDS, PDS Hospitals & Patients Data Sharing
G,B, p Elliptic curve; base point on G, prime
EΩ(m) = (C1,C2) ElG encrypt. ofm under key Ω,
=(rB,mB+rΩ) nonce r
K CNs pub. coll. key
(ki,Ki) CNs CNi priv., pub. key
A,A1,A2, Yi, yi ZKPs pub. (uppercase), discrete log.
Q,DP ,N Querier, Data Provider, #DP
CN , VN Computing & Verifying Node
fh Threshold of honest VNs
pi, ρ, r¯i linear combi., encoding, records
Vi=[vi,1,...,vi,l], ci vector, count
CTA, CTO, CTKS Coll. Tree Aggr., Obfusc., Key Switch.
wi,1,wi,2 CNi’s contribution in CTKS
αi, si CNi secret random nonce
CDP , (, δ, θ) Coll. Diff. Privacy & params.
[bl,bu], [0,ul) Range, default range
xi, (Ai,j, Zi,H, Vi,j, ai,j) Range proof priv., pub. values
T , Tsub Proofs and sub-proofs verif. thresh.
Nda,Ni,D Tot. &DPi #records, dataset dim.
pver, pversub proof, sub-proof
Pfh prob. of fh VNs verif.
TABLE III: Table of Recurrent Symbols.
APPENDIX B
ERROR PROBABILITY
In Section VII, we notice that the result of bit-wise operations, whenDPs are requested to answer with random valuesRis,
can be erroneous with a probability smaller than 1/(#G−1). We demonstrate here this result and provide an expression for
the probability of error Pn where n is the number ofDPs.
Pn=P(
n∑
i=1
Ri=0)=
#G−1∑
a=0
P(
n∑
i=1
Ri=0|
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)·P(
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)
=P(
n∑
i=1
Ri=0|
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=0)·P(
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=0)
+
#G−1∑
a=1
P(
n∑
i=1
Ri=0|
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)·P(
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)
=
#G−1∑
a=1
P(
n∑
i=1
Ri=0|
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)·P(
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)
=P(Rn=−a)·
#G−1∑
a=1
P(
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)
= 1
#G−1 ·
#G−1∑
a=1
P(
n−1∑
i=1
Ri=a)=
1
#G−1 ·(1−Pn−1).
We have Pn= 1#G−1 ·(1−Pn−1)≤ 1#G−1 and Pn=
n∑
i=2
(−1)i·( 1
#G−1 )
i−1.
